Visiting Research Scholar, Department of Economics, Dartmouth College.
Senior Research Economist, Banco de España (on leave).
PhD in Economics (University of Edinburgh, 2024).
Research Interests: macroeconomics, finance, and growth.
Contact: enric.martorell@dartmouth.edu
We study the risk-taking implications of the deposit channel of monetary policy during the most intense tightening cycle of the Euro era. Using the universal Spanish credit register and regional variation in deposit market concentration, we show that limited pass-through of policy rates to deposit rates produces heterogeneous effects on bank credit supply and risk-taking. Following the tightening cycle, banks operating in more concentrated deposit markets reduced credit more sharply to riskier firms. For newly originated loans, this contraction was accompanied by higher interest rates and improved realized returns. We document a novel dimension of the deposit channel: it compels banks to actively optimize their risk-return trade-off. Our results show that preserving deposit franchise value leads banks to prioritize prudence, reversing the "search-for-yield" dynamic observed during the zero-lower-bound era.
We examine the interplay between monetary policy and financial stability in a macroeconomic model with endogenous bank risk-taking. The optimal policy combination involves 11% bank capital requirements coupled with a crisis management policy that releases capital buffers and generates moderate inflation to sustain bank net worth through increased net interest margins. Low r* increases bank risk-taking (requiring tighter capital requirements) but also raises the economy's need for credit (requiring looser capital requirements). The two effects offset each other resulting in broadly unchanged capital requirements.
How do energy-price shocks transmit through credit markets? Using Spanish credit-register and loan-application data around the 2022 European energy crisis, we study how higher energy costs affect borrower repayment, bank-recognized credit risk, and credit allocation. Energy-intensive firms become more likely to miss loan payments, and lenders classify more credit to these firms as non-performing, increase provisions, and assign higher probabilities of default. Banks more exposed to this deterioration reallocate credit toward incumbents, particularly energy-intensive firms, and away from prospective borrowers by reducing new relationship formation. Real shocks can thus propagate through banks by changing who gets credit, not only how much.